Showing 1 - 6 of 6
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877109
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (QJE, 1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (EER, 1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904139
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig (1987) under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010241593
High frequency arbitrage opportunities sometimes arise when the price of one asset follows, with a lag, changes in the value of another related asset due to information arrival. These opportunities are toxic because they expose liquidity suppliers to the risk of being picked off by arbitrageurs....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083979
High frequency arbitrage opportunities arise when the price of one asset follows, with a lag, changes in the value of another related asset due to information arrival. These opportunities are toxic because they expose liquidity suppliers to the risk of being picked off by arbitrageurs. Hence,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011147709