When public long-term care (LTC) insurance is provided by insurers, they typically lack incentives for purchasing cost-effective LTC. Providing insurers with appropriate incentives for efficiency without jeopardizing access for high-risk individuals requires, among other things, an adequate...

In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on con- sumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance...

This study tests for adverse selection in the established Affordable Care Act (ACA) health insurance exchanges established in 2014, and quantifies the consequences for consumer welfare and market efficiency. Using a new statewide dataset of medical claims from Colorado, I use plausibly exogenous...

Advantageous (or propitious) selection occurs when an increase in the premium of an insurance contract induces high-cost agents to quit, thereby reducing the average cost among remaining buyers. Hemenway (1990) and many subsequent contributions motivate its advent by differences in risk-aversion...

This paper studies general health insurance markets. It proposes an ex post risk adjustment scheme that discourages risk selection and promotes efficient competition. Under the proposed risk adjustment scheme, the regulator engages in transfers that are conditional on the ex post profits of...

In many markets insurers are barred from price discrimination based on consumer characteristics like age, gender, and medical history. In this paper, I build on a recent literature to show why such policies are inefficient if consumers differ in their willingness-to-pay for insurance conditional...

This paper studies redistributional effects of competition between private and public insurance on health insurance markets based on the example of Germany. Health insurance is provided by a budget-balancing public insurance and a revenue-maximizing private insurance; customers are characterized...

In this essay, we review the theory and evidence concerning selection in competitive health insurance markets and discuss the common policy tools used to address the problems it creates. We begin by outlining some important but often misunderstood differences between two types of conceptual...

This paper examines whether offering a health savings account (HSA)-eligible health plan for free, alongside other health plan options with a premium, alters employee enrollment choices; and if responders differ by health status. The data for this study come from two large employers and cover...

I take advantage of regulatory and pricing dynamics in Medicare Part D to empirically explore interactions among adverse selection, switching costs, and regulation. I first document novel evidence of adverse selection and switching costs within Part D using detailed administrative data. I then...