This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...

The aim of this paper is to study asset reallocation in financial markets subject to search, bargaining, and information frictions, and to analyze the impact of monetary policy on equilibrium outcomes. The main results show that private information regarding the quality of an asset impairs its...

I develop a dynamic version of the competitive search model with adverse selection in Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010). My model allows for an analysis of the effects of firm learning on labor market efficiency in the presence of search frictions. I find that firm learning increases relative...

We study a market with entrepreneurial and workers entry where both entrepreneurs' abilities and workers' qualities are private information. We develop an Agent-Based Computable model to mimic the mechanisms described in a previous analytical model (Boadway and Sato 2011). Then, we introduce the...

We examine the convertible bonds whose conversion prices can be reset under certain conditions, by extending the asymmetric information framework of Stein (1992). These convertibles are more common in Japan and China and are in sharp contrast with the convertible bonds with fixed conversion...

Micro data from a dental insurance natural experiment is used to analyze why agents opt out of insurance. The purpose is to relate the dropout decision to new information on risk, acquired by the policy holder and the insurer. The results show that agents tend to leave the insurance when...

This paper tests for incentive and selection effects in a subprime consumer credit market. We estimate the incentive effect of loan size on default using sharp discontinuities in loan eligibility rules. This allows us to estimate the magnitude of selection from the cross-sectional correlation...

I analyse a market with asymmetric information, interdependent values and trade frictions. The frictions can be reduced at a cost, e.g. by increasing attention, search, lobbying or computing power. For some parameters, there is a unique equilibrium in which an increase in the gains from trade...

We study market dynamics when an owner learns over time about the quality of her asset. Since this information is private, the owner sells strategically to a less informed buyer following sufficient negative information. In response, market prices feature a "U-shape" relative to the length of...

This paper studies the effects of the signal available before a standard Baron-Myerson contracting takes place. It shows that, while the principal's profits increase with the quality of the signal, the agent's rent also increases if the signal concerns the realizations where the principal is...