We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed fi rms results always in...

In this paper, we provide a unified framework for analyzing competitive markets with adverse selection. The key feature of our model is that whether the suppliers of the contracts (uninformed) are committed to the contracts they offer or not is determined endogenously. Because of the endogeneity...