This paper looks for evidence of adverse selection in the relationship between primary insurers and reinsurers. We test the implications of a model in which informational asymmetry – and therefore, its negative consequences – decline over time. Our tests involve a data panel consisting of...

This paper proposes a reengineered and robust approach to optimal economic capital allocation, in a Liquidity-Adjusted Value at Risk (LVaR) framework, and particularly from the perspective of trading portfolios that have both long and short trading positions and disallowing both long-only...

This research study analyses, from a fund manager’s perspective, the performance of liquidity adjusted risk modeling in obtaining optimal and coherent economic capital structures, subject to meaningful operational and financial constraints as specified by the fund manager. Specifically, the...

While risk selection within the German public health insurance system has received considerable attention, risk selection between public and private health insurers has largely been ignored. This is surprising since – given the institutional structure – risk selection between systems is...

While risk selection within the German public health insurance system has received considerable attention, risk selection between public and private health insurers has largely been ignored. This is surprising since - given the institutional structure - risk selection between systems is likely...

This paper proposes a principal-agent framework to study the optimal transfer of longevity risk between a reinsurer and a hedger under information asymmetry. Most hedgers in the real world have rather small portfolios which are hard to be accurately estimated by the reinsurer. Using indemnity...

In a continuous-time setting, we study the design of a dynamic contract between a government and a private entity, wherein the latter commits to pay the government in return for the exclusive right to sell a service by operating a public facility. Private revenues are modelled as depending on...

We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-agent relationship where the agent produces information that is useful to the principal. The agent values continuous employment for the principal because he makes a relationship-specific investment that can yield...

We examine optimal taxation and social insurance if insurance markets are imperfect. This requires the development of a theory of labor supply under uncertainty. We show that the case for social insurance is not generally reinforced by adverse selection in insurance markets as social insurance...

In this survey we present some of the more significant results in the literature on adverse selection in insurance markets. Sections 1 and 2 introduce the subject and Section 3 discusses the monopoly model developed by Stiglitz (1977) for the case of single-period contracts extended by many...