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Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
Luz, Vitor Farinha - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 3, pp. 1349-1391
's (1976) model of competitive insurance. I allow for stochastic contract offers by insurance firms and show that a unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744297
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011672191
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Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection
Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015
We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention. Their provision alters the optimality criteria in the principal's decision-making, further distorts the mechanism, and may lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575
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Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057288
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical Economics 11 (2016) 1, pp. 253-278
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599569
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - In: Theoretical Economics (2015)
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011157218
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Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying
Rhee, Keeyoung - 2020
agent truthfully reports that the project is likely to give a high return. The optimal outcome is achieved by a contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841686
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Staged-Financing Contracts with Private Information
Wang, Hefei - 2008
population are technically constrained from falsifying reports and stealing cash. The original Bolton-Scharfstein contract may … not be optimal for a large range of parametric values. The optimal contract may induce falsification and stealing in … equilibrium and social welfare may be improved. Moreover, the optimal contract does not screen different types of agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057550
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Designing contracts for the energy transition
Fabra, Natalia; Llobet, Gerard - 2025
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015418990