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Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003931045

Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Journal of mathematical economics 46 (2010) 5, pp. 807-816

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009300195

Essays on the economic theory of contracts and incentives : organizational design, adverse selection, and contractual freedom

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134799

Contracting under adverse selection : certifiable vs. uncertifiable information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 182 (2021), pp. 100-112

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598262

Optimal contracting with verifiable ex post signals

Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph; Schmitz, … - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001553477

Contracting under Adverse Selection : Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information

Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2021

The analysis of adverse selection problems in seller-buyer relationships has typically been based on the assumption that private information is uncertifiable, while in practice it may well be certifiable. If a buyer has certifiable private information, he can conceal evidence, but he cannot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247965