This paper demonstrates the incentives for an oligopolist to obfuscate by deliberately increasing the cost with which consumers can locate its product and price.  Consumers are allowed to choose the optimal order in which to search firms and firms are able to influence this order through their...

There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze...

There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers, and analyze the...

To provide a more exible workhorse model of temporary price reductions or "sales", this paper presents a substantially generalized "clearinghouse" sales framework. Our framework permits multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity, and views firms as competing directly in utility rather than...