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The design of institutions : an agency theory perspective

Banks, Jeffrey S. - In: Institutional design, (pp. 17-36). 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001316567

Optimal retention in agency problems

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Sundaram, Rangarajan K. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000981148

Long-lived principals, short-lived agents

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Sundaram, Rangarajan K. - 1993 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000870102

Optimal retention in agency problems

Banks, Jeffrey S. - In: Journal of economic theory 82 (1998) 2, pp. 293-323

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001251537

Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Journal of economic theory 153 (2014), pp. 74-102

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010479517

Local agency costs of political centralization

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 425-448

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587346

Fundamental theory of institutions : a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz, (pp. 35-51). 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061431

Moral hazard in high office and the dynamics of aristocracy

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 83 (2015) 6, pp. 2083-2126

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431538