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Asymmetric-information and principal-agent problems as sources of value in FSLIC-assisted acquisitions of insolvent thrifts

Cole, Rebel A. - In: Journal of financial services research : JFSR 8 (1994) 1, pp. 5-28

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001170826

Agency problems and goal conflicts

Eisenbeis, Robert A. (contributor) - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002574921

Agency problems in banking supervision

Eisenbeis, Robert A. - In: Designing financial supervision institutions : …, (pp. 438-470). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003695909

Agency problems and goal conflicts in achieving financial stability : the case of the EMU

Eisenbeis, Robert A. - In: The structure of financial regulation, (pp. 232-263). 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003482686

When are thrift institutions closed? : an agency-theoretic model

Cole, Rebel A. - In: Journal of financial services research : JFSR 7 (1993) 4, pp. 283-307

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001160511

Agency costs and ownership structure

Ang, James S.; Cole, Rebel A.; Lin, James Wuh - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 55 (2000) 1, pp. 81-106

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001496865

Agency conflicts, expropriation and firm value : evidence from securities-market regulation in China

Berkman, Henk; Cole, Rebel A.; Fu, Jiang - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003361119

Agency costs and ownership structure

Ang, James S.; Cole, Rebel A.; Lin, James Wuh - In: Corporate governance and corporate finance : a European …, (pp. 111-131). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003613143

What do we know about executive compensation at small privately held firms?

Cole, Rebel A.; Mehran, Hamid - In: Small business economics : an entrepreneurship journal 46 (2016) 2, pp. 215-237

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011618670

Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

Ang, James S.; Cole, Rebel A.; Lin, James Wuh - 2008

We provide measures of absolute and relative equity agency costs for corporations under different ownership and management structures. Our base case is Jensen and Meckling's (1976) zero agency-cost firm, where the manager is the firm's sole shareholder. We utilize a sample of 1,708 small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051339