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The wrong kind of transparency

Prat, Andrea - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001757007

The wrong kind of transparency

Prat, Andrea - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001713779

Games played through agents

Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, Aldo - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001415925

Games played through agents

Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, Aldo - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 71 (2003) 4, pp. 989-1026

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001792642

The wrong kind of transparency

Prat, Andrea - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002378944

Inefficient equilibria in lobbying

Kirchsteiger, Georg; Prat, Andrea - In: Journal of public economics 82 (2001) 3, pp. 349-375

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001634845

Managerial attention and worker engagement

Halac, Marina; Prat, Andrea - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382129

The wrong kind of transparency

Prat, Andrea - In: The American economic review 95 (2005) 3, pp. 862-877

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003203476

Managerial attention and worker performance

Halac, Marina; Prat, Andrea - In: The American economic review 106 (2016) 10, pp. 3104-3132

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011582356

Sequential Common Agency

Prat, Andrea; Rustichini, Aldo - 1999

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent whichdepend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014192030