Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on a number of reform outcomes. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reform, we find that these outcome...

Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on the financial performance of the reformed firms. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reforms, we find that...

Using data from a recent national survey on the ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China, we study the effects of reducing politician control and agency problems on a number of reform outcomes. Taking into account the endogenous nature of the reform, we find that these outcome...

This paper studies the role of agency in the self-enforcement of interfirm contracts. When interfirm transactions are carried out by the agents rather than the owners, the agents' incentive to breach a contract for the benefit of their firm is typically lower than that of the owners if doing so...