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Information and Incentives Inside the Firm : Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

Paravisini, Daniel - 2011

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119363

Information and incentives inside the firm : evidence from loan officer rotation

Hertzberg, Andrew; Liberti, Jose Maria; Paravisini, Daniel - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 65 (2010) 3, pp. 795-828

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003982040

Active agents, passive principals : does high-powered CEO compensation really improve incentives?

Dow, James (contributor); Raposo, Clara (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001700623

Non-redundant derivatives in a dynamic general equilibrium economy

Bhamra, Harjoat S. (contributor); Uppal, Raman (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001777039

The equity risk premium and the riskfree rate in an economy with borrowing constraints

Kogan, Leonid (contributor); Makarov, Igor (contributor); … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001777044

The organization of delegated expertise

Gromb, Denis (contributor); Martimort, David (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001994571