This note provides an explanation for why tax rates on capital gains are usually lower than ordinary income tax rates based on manager's agency problem related to "empire-building" and the underinvestment problem

This note provides an explanation for why tax rates on capital gains are usually lower than ordinary income tax rates based on manager's agency problem related to "empire-building" and the underinvestment problem

Chatty and Saez (2004) argued that more Principal-Agent models explaining firm dividend policy are expected and subsequently offered a model of dividend policy that includes a tax on dividends and agency problems (Chatty and Saez (2007)). In this paper we extent their model by adding a tax on...

This note compares the investment policy and managerial compensation in family and non-family firms. The model is based on one hand a manager/shareholders conflict that should be more pronounced in non-family firms. Secondly large shareholders/small shareholders conflict should play a...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is considering launching a web-based platform. Our model is the first one that analyzes an entrepreneur's choice between security tokens (via a security token offering (STO)) and utility tokens (via initial coin offering...

We consider a principal-agent relationship, where the agent is subject to a double moral hazardproblem (the choice of production effort and earnings manipulation). Since the agent cannot completely capture the results of his effort, the production effort is socially inefficient. The opportunity...

This paper considers a financing problem for an innovative firm that is launching a web-based platform. The entrepreneur, on one hand, faces a large degree of demand uncertainty onhis product and on the other hand has to deal with incentive problems of professional blockchainparticipants who...