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Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V.; Grigoriadis, Theocharis - 2018

Proxy wars are a key pattern of political conflict and interstate competition. Rather than resorting to direct … the double principal-agent relationship predicts the continuation of conflict and thus the emergence of peace. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805757

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

A model of Charles Ponzi

Barlevy, Gadi; Xavier, Inês - 2025

-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015332994

Haggling for rents, relational contracts, and the theory of the firm

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, a formal rent-seeking theory of the firm is developed. The main idea is that integration (compared to non-integration) facilitates rent-seeking for the integrating party, but makes it harder for the integrated one. In a one-period model, this implies that the rent-seeking contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383041

Haggling for Rents, Relational Contracts, and the Theory of the Firm

Gürtler, Oliver - 2010

I analyze how ownership can be structured to minimize the haggling costs due to contractual incompleteness. I model haggling as a contest in which integration gives the integrating party a relative advantage over the integrated party. In a one-period model, this implies that the contest will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014188796

The Fragmentation of Reputation

Bose, Gautam - 2008

This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of … acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. This allows consideration of two different reputation … information about past defections is available separately for each task. The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048046

Incentives, Reputation and the Allocation of Authority

Englmaier, Florian; Filipi, Ales; Singh, Ravi - 2010

opportunistic behavior, but may cause the manager to pursue conservative courses of action to preserve his reputation. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014197745

The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism

Tadelis, Steven - 2002

Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short-lived agents to work hard, but it is well known that these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life cycle incentives of firm owners to exert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014124663

The Market for Reputations as an Incentive Mechanism

Tadelis, Steven - 2001

Reputational career concerns provide incentives for short lived agents, but these incentives disappear as an agent reaches retirement. This paper investigates the effects of a market for firm reputations on the life-cycle incentives of firm owners to exert effort. A dynamic general equilibrium...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014125568