Recent studies in managerial accounting point out that the firms do not fully ratchet up the managers' future performance targets based on their past performance. This study offers a novel theoretical perspective on the firm's executive compensation strategy that supports such latest empirical...

This paper proposes an agency model with moral hazard and adverse selection of the relationship between a university and its president, and constructs a unique dataset to examine the determinants of the compensation of university presidents. In our model, the outcome of interest to the...

This paper examines the role of multiple measures of performance in a principal-agent model incorporating both moral hazard and adverse selection. The outcome of interest to the principal depends stochastically on the agent’s unobservable ability and effort, while the principal implements a...

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....

This paper proposes a principal-agent model of moral hazard and adverse selection that introduces the notion of screening, which is distinct from sorting; and distinguishes between ability that is privately known by the agent versus general ability that is observable by the principal and market....