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Trust and reputation under asymmetric information

Janas, Moritz; Oljemark, Emilia - 2020 - Version: September 10, 2020

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494

Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning

Pei, Harry - 2019

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

We consider an infinitely repeated game in which a privately informed, long-lived manager raises funds from short-lived investors in order to finance a project. The manager can signal project quality to investors by making a (possibly costly) forward-looking disclosure about her project's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504350

The forward-looking disclosures of corporate managers : theory and evidence

Gropp, Reint; Karapandža, Raša; Opferkuch, Julian - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011506852

Optimal delegation of sequential decisions : the role of communication and reputation

Atakan, Alp; Koçkesen, Levent; Kubilay, Elif - 2017

gradually builds up her reputation. Principal provides full information in every period as long as he has always observed his …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011609923

Random inspections and periodic reviews : optimal dynamic monitoring

Varas, Felipe; Marinovic, Iván; Skrzypacz, Andrzej - 2018

reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865082