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Cashing by the hour: why law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Garoupa, Nuno (contributor); Gómez, Fernando (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001697195

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

Ganuza, Juan José (contributor); … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002113471

Cashing by the hour : why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees

Garoupa, Nuno; Gómez, Fernando - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 24 (2008) 2, pp. 458-475

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003761458

The charms of vagueness in contracts : comment

Gómez, Fernando - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 164 (2008) 1, pp. 99-105

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666973

Cashing by the Hour : Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees

Garoupa, Nuno - 2010

Large law firms seem to prefer hourly fees over contingent fees. This article provides a moral hazard explanation for this pattern of behavior. Contingent legal fees tend to align the interests of the attorney with those of the client but not necessarily with those of the partnership. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012715709

Pay for performance in procurement

Ganuza, Juan José; Gómez, Fernando; Hanazono, Makoto - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014302684