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Shields, Michael; Wheatley Price, Stephen - 2001

We study bilateral bargaining problems with interested third parties, the stakeholders that enjoy benefits upon a … potential willingness of the stakeholder to make contributions to promote agreement may be the source of severe inefficiency …. However, and more surprisingly, for a wide range of parameter values this outcome is better for the stakeholder than if he …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405186

Stakeholders, bargaining and strikes

Manzini, Paola; Ponsatí, Clara - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647017

Pharmacy Benefit Managers as Bargaining Agents

Abrams, Lawrence - 2016

misconceptions about PBMs that can be traced to price theory. Proposed is an alternative view based on bargaining theory. There are … several fundamental insights gained by looking at PBMs through bargaining theory. First, rebates are not received in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012981790

Enhancing Honesty in Bargaining Under Incomplete Information : An Experimental Study of the Bonus Procedure

Parco, James E.; Rapoport, Amnon - 2008

The sealed-bid k-double auction mechanism for two-person bargaining under incomplete information can be extended by … results show that implementation of a bonus has a significant impact on bargaining behavior but not nearly to the extent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028811

Relational contracting, repeated negotiations, and hold-up : conference paper

Kranz, Sebastian - 2013

We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We first illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010336791

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2017

We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiating a chosen contract. We model this by allowing the principal to propose new contracts any number of times after observing the contract choice of the agent. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753991

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Initiation of Merger and Acquisition Negotiation with Two-Sided Private Information

Chen, Yi - 2015

In a dynamic model of merger negotiation with two-sided private information two-sided endogenous initiation, this paper investigates (1) what determines the timing of M&A initiation, and (2) who initiates the M&A negotiation; (3) why bid premia are different between target-initiated deals and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013015154

Optimal Imperfect Commitments in a Negotiation with a Deadline

Cunyat, Antoni - 2002

One major finding of the bargaining literature is that the more irrevocable a commitment is, the better for the … assumptions of the bargaining literature related to the uncertainty and irrevocability of commitments. We allow players not only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035357