This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...

We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages on optimal job design within firms. In our model, two tasks affect firm value and an imperfect performance measure. Due to cost advantages of specialization, assigning the tasks to different agents is efficient. Yet a sufficiently large wage floor...

We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve...

We analyze the optimal interaction between monetary incentives and decision-making authority with respect to task assignment in a production process with two agents, each exerting non-observable effort in their main task. A further task needs to be performed and one agent is privately informed...

In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the effect of performance pay and two common leadership techniques: Positive expectations and specific goals. We find that positive expectations have a significant negative effect...