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Escobar, Juan F.; Zhang, Qiaoxi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 571-603

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587421

Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability

Bester, Helmut; Ouyang, Yaofu - 2017

This paper analyzes the optimal contract for a consumer to procure a credence good from an expert when (i) the expert might misrepresent his private information about the consumer’s need, (ii) the expert might not choose the requested service since his choice of treatment is non-observable,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011781931

Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets : On-Demand Contracts As a Screening Device

Braun, Alexander - 2020

We show that on-demand insurance contracts, an innovative form of coverage recently introduced through the InsurTech sector, can serve as a screening device. To this end, we develop a new adverse selection model consistent with Wilson (1977), Miyazaki (1977) and Spence (1978). Consumers have...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822927

Precontractual investigation and sequential screening

Terstiege, Stefan - 2013

Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969

Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents

Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza - 2018

A model of over-the-counter markets is proposed. Some asset buyers are informed in that they can identify high-quality assets. Heterogeneous sellers with private information choose what type of buyers they want to trade with. When the measure of informed buyers is low, there exists a unique and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012933219

Optimal Delegated Search with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013057288

Adverse Selection with Heterogeneously Informed Agents

Davoodalhosseini, Seyed Mohammadreza - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014254506

On existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses

Denderski, Piotr; Stoltenberg, Christian - 2021

We study the existence of a profitable unemployment insurance market in a dynamic economy with adverse selection rooting in information on future job losses. The new feature of the model is that the insurer and workers interact repeatedly. Repeated interactions make it possible to threaten...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545133

Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard

Ulbricht, Robert - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239

Sweet lemons : mitigating collusion in organizations

Pollrich, Martin; Negenborn, Colin von - 2018

This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729