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Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L.; Kim, Jinwoo - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 659-665

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248413

Assigning resources to budget-constrained agents

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L.; Kim, Jinwoo - In: The review of economic studies 80 (2013) 1, pp. 73-107

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009712478

Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines

Mierendorff, Konrad - In: Journal of economic theory 161 (2016), pp. 190-222

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011592989

Revolving doors and the optimal tolerance for agency collusion

Che, Yeon-Koo - In: The Rand journal of economics 26 (1995) 3, pp. 378-397

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001190242

Three essays on economic incentive mechanisms : studies on procurement, regulation and tort

Che, Yeon-Koo - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000876380

Pandering to Persuade

Che, Yeon-Koo - 2011

A principal chooses one of n ≥ 2 projects or an outside option. An agent is privately informed about the projects' beneﬁts and shares the principal's preferences except for not internalizing her value from the outside option. We show that strategic communication is characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133146