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Precontractual investigation and sequential screening

Terstiege, Stefan - 2013

Should contract design induce an agent to conduct a precontractual investigation even though, in any case, the agent will become fully informed after the signing of the contract? This paper shows that imperfect investigations might be encouraged. The result stands in contrast to previous...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198969

Trading dynamics with private buyer signals in the market for lemons

Kaya, Ayça; Kim, Kyungmin - In: The review of economic studies 85 (2018) 4/305, pp. 2318-2352

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012263384

Optimal contracting with altruistic agents : a structural model of Medicare payments for dialysis drugs

Gaynor, Martin; Mehta, Nirav; Richards-Shubik, Seth - 2020

We study physician agency and optimal payment policy in the context of an expensive medication used in dialysis care. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which physicians differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012216358

Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information

Metzger, Lars - 2015

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967

On cheating and whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either … behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417290

Delegated Selling and Intermediated Signaling

Janssen, Maarten; Roy, Santanu - 2023

intermediary the manufacturer can hide information about product quality, prevent double marginalization and avoid signaling … distortions associated with direct selling. For intermediated signaling games of this sort, we outline a notion of equilibrium … refinement that is motivated by considerations similar to the Intuitive Criterion for standard signaling games and show that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262515

Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016

The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurance) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530065

Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts

Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020

We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181

On cheating and whistleblowing

Berentsen, Aleksander; Brügger, Esther; Loertscher, Simon - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002346437

Information and Delay in an Agency Model

Drugov, Mikhail - 2010

This article studies how delay in contracting depends on an exogenous signal. The agent whose cost is his private information may produce in the first period or be delayed until the second period. A signal about the cost of the agent is available between the two periods. The quality of the good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222846