employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be bad. The justification assures the agent that the principal has not … her evaluation. For good performance, however, the principal pays a constant high wage without justification. Furthermore …Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

discrete bonuses after they do sufficiently well. By adjusting monitoring intensity and communication of performance, the …

rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by … reflects the agent's private ability, a simple equity contract is optimal …