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Long-term contracting : the role of private information in dynamic supply risk management

Gao, Long - In: Production and operations management : an international … 24 (2015) 10, pp. 1570-1579

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389216

Contractive dual methods for incentive problems

Messner, Matthias; Pavoni, Nicola; Sleet, Christopher - 2012 - This version: July, 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011817969

Optimal excess-of-loss reinsurance contract with ambiguity aversion in the principal-agent model

Gu, Ailing; Viens, Frederi G.; Shen, Yang - In: Scandinavian actuarial journal 2020 (2020) 4, pp. 342-375

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The when and how of delegated search

Zorc, Sasa; Tsetlin, Ilia; Hasija, Sameer - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012160112

Multi-agent scheduling problems under multitasking

Wang, Dujuan; Yu, Yugang; Yin, Yunqiang; Cheng, T. C. E. - In: International journal of production research 59 (2021) 12, pp. 3633-3663

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012589239

Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems

Renner, Philipp; Scheidegger, Simon - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012178446

Optimal reinsurance pricing with ambiguity aversion and relative performance concerns in the principal-agent model

Gu, Ailing; Chen, Shumin; Li, Zhongfei; Viens, Frederi G. - In: Scandinavian actuarial journal 2022 (2022) 9, pp. 749-774

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013419039

The when and how of delegated search

Zorc, Sasa; Tsetlin, Ilia; Hasija, Sameer; Chick, Stephen E. - 2022 - Revised version of 2019/44/DSC/TOM

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013177075

Managerial incentive problems and return distributions

Szalaly, Dezső; Yokeeswaran, Venuga - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467555

Managerial incentive problems and return distributions

Szalay, Dezső; Yokeeswaran, Venuga - 2014

We study a model of managerial incentive problems where a manager chooses the first two moments of his firm's profit distribution - mean and volatility - along an efficient frontier. Assuming that managers differ with respect to their marginal cost of effort and their risk aversion we explore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010457192