Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Incentive Schemes, Private Information and the Double-Edged Role of Competition for Agents

Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162185

Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents

Bannier, Christina E.; Feess, Eberhard; Packham, Natalie; … - 2016

This paper examines the effect of imperfect labor market competition on the efficiency of compensation schemes in a setting with moral hazard and risk-averse agents, who have private information on their productivity. Two vertically differentiated firms compete for agents by offering contracts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498942

Safety regulation and monitor liability

Feess, Eberhard; Hege, Ulrich - In: Review of economic design : RED 7 (2002) 2, pp. 173-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001706869

Delegated expertise - when are good projects bad news?

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - In: Economics letters 82 (2004) 1, pp. 77-82

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001877567

The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model

Feess, Eberhard; Ossig, Sonja; Walzl, Markus - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 29-45

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523339

Discussion of "The impact of truth-telling and limited wealth in a principal-agent model"

Ewert, Ralf - In: Schmalenbach business review : sbr 57 (2005) 1, pp. 46-54

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002523355

When should prinipals asquire verifiable information?

Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002721593

Why it pays to conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information

Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael; Walzl, Markus - In: German economic review 12 (2011) 1, pp. 100-123

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009129655

Why it pays to Conceal : on the optimal timing of acquiring verifiable information

Feess, Eberhard; Walzl, Markus - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003383565

Credit scoring and incentives for loan officers in a principal agent model

Feess, Eberhard; Schieble, Michael - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013444384

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