We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …

relational contract could establish cooperation through peer monitoring even under relative performance evaluation, which …

contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment …

optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …