Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Convertible securities and venture capital finance

Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1999

This paper offers a new explanation for the prevalent use of convertible securities in venture capital finance. Convertible securities can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow rights as a function of the realized quality of the project. This property can be used to mitigate the double...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781712

Unverifiable information, incomplete contracts, and renegotiation

Nöldeke, Georg - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000834045

Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision

Hellwig, Martin; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000998173

The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts

Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Economics letters 48 (1995) 2, pp. 193-199

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001190171

Incentives in organizations : an overview of some of the evidence and theory

MacLeod, William Bentley; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Trends in business organization: do participation and …, (pp. 3-42). 1995

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001289808

Der Markt für Venture Capital : Anreizprobleme, Governance Strukturen und staatliche Interventionen

Gebhardt, Georg; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik : eine Zeitschrift … 3 (2002) 3, pp. 235-255

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001687032

Discrete-time approximations of the Holmström-Milgrom Brownian-motion model of intertemporal incentive provision

Hellwig, Martin; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 70 (2002) 6, pp. 2225-2264

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001713872

Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 106 (2004) 3, pp. 453-474

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002446347

Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002160995

Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model

Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002182016

A service of the