Similar Search Results

Efficient private production of public goods under common agency

Laussel, Didier; Le Breton, Michel - In: Social organization and mechanism design : …, (pp. 185-207). 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001463008

On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games

Konishi, Hideo; Le Breton, Michel; Weber, Shlomo - In: Journal of economic theory 85 (1999) 1, pp. 122-139

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001368960

Efficient private production of public goods under common agency

Laussel, Didier; Le Breton, Michel - In: Games and economic behavior 25 (1998) 2, pp. 194-218

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001379425

La théorie de l'agence commune en information complète

Laussel, Didier - In: Revue économique : revue bimestrielle 47 (1996) 3, pp. 447-455

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001334268

Complements and substitutes in common agency

Laussel, Didier - In: Ricerche economiche 50 (1996) 4, pp. 325-345

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001212139

Conflict and cooperation : the structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency

Laussel, Didier; Le Breton, Michel - In: Journal of economic theory 100 (2001) 1, pp. 93-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001612234

Lobbying under political uncertainty

Le Breton, Michel; Salanié, François - In: Journal of public economics 87 (2003) 12, pp. 2589-2610

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001823213

"Favors" for sale : strategic analysis of a simple menu auction with adverse selection

Laussel, Didier; Le Breton, Michel - In: Annals of economics and finance 6 (2005) 1, pp. 53-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003072687

Simple centrifugal incentives in downsian dynamics

Laussel, Didier; Le Breton, Michel; Xefteris, Dimitrios - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009762429

Advantageous Selection Without Moral Hazard (with an Application to Life Care Annuities)

De Donder, Philippe; Leroux, M.‐L; Salanié, François - 2022

Advantageous (or propitious) selection occurs when an increase in the premium of an insurance contract induces high-cost agents to quit, thereby reducing the average cost among remaining buyers. Hemenway (1990) and many subsequent contributions motivate its advent by differences in risk-aversion...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083046