Over the past few decades, the rapid growth of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has received interest from academics and practitioners. While M&As continue to be the subject of thorough investigation from a corporate governance standpoint, comparatively less effort has been made to organize and...

This paper outlines the foundations of corporate governance. The discussion includes a review on the modern corporation, transaction costs theory, agency costs theory, legal investor protection, investor protection by corporate governance and its various mechanisms, as well as an overview of the...

This paper outlines the foundations of corporate governance.  The discussion includes a review on the modern corporation, transaction costs theory, agency costs theory, legal investor protection, investor protection by corporate governance and its various mechanisms, as well as an overview of...

This study investigates how debt maturity structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. The empirical evidence reveals an inverse relation between the strength of shareholder rights and debt maturity. We contend that managers of firms with weak shareholder rights eschew choosing...

Motivated by agency theory, we investigate how a firm’s overall quality of corporate governance affects its dividend policy. Using a large sample of firms with governance data from The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), we find that firms with stronger governance exhibit a higher...

For more than a decade, to reduce the agency problem, various ways have been examined on how to align the interest of manager with shareholders. However, evidence and empirical findings are conflicting on the agency problem. Recently, deferred compensation as one of incentive compensations draws...

Specified Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are a special type of public companies currently available to investors in financial markets. As an investment vehicle, modern SPACs are traced back to 18th century England where blank checks were first mentioned as blind pools during the infamous...

Conventional wisdom among corporate law theorists holds that the presence of a controlling shareholder should alleviate the problem of managerial opportunism because such a controller has both the power and incentives to curb excessive executive pay. This Article challenges that common...

In 2001, Nevada significantly limited the personal legal liability of corporate officers and directors. We use this exogenous shock to implement a differences-in-differences design that examines the impact of officer and director litigation risk on agency costs. We find decreased firm value,...

In order to capture and lead the market, a board should be able to understand and quickly react to the changing global market. The market is very complex and highly segmented according to factors such as gender, age and ethnicity. Therefore, having a diverse board is advantageous because the...