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We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...
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This paper considers the eff ects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041476
We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by which her value for a good evolves. In addition, the realized values are also private information. We characterize a class of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043776
This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of tasks, in which the agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matches are remade every period, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048046
This paper studies a novel dynamic principle agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an expert whose skills are his private information, faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Each task's level of difficulty is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069
This paper considers the effects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165946