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Di Tillio, Alfredo; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2014

This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062

Selling to the mean

Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - 2015

We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer's valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298549

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366

Auctions of Incentive Contracts for Policy Choice

Del Villar, Francisco - 2023

contract to an agent through an auction. The paper finds the class of contract-auction pairs that guarantee the principal a non …-possible expected payoff. The work is based on two contract-auction-specific assumptions: that the contract induces the contracted agent … to weakly improve the outcome, and that the auction satisfies a revenue guarantee. Under these assumptions, the principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014357642

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

A Principal-Agent Model of Bidding Firms in Multi-Unit Auctions

Paulsen, Per - 2016

price wars in high-stakes auctions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992976

The Ratchet Effect and Bargaining Power in a Two-Stage Model of Competitive Bidding

Waehrer, Keith - 1999

the primary good will fail to ensure an efficient allocation if the buyer learns the bid of the winner and the price of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206917

Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts

Jun, Byoung - 2014

-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470

Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234

Auctions and corruption

Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000

propose a model of corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how the anticipation of corruption affects … that may prevent corruption, and compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction houses. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659