Showing 1 - 4 of 4
I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226
We study a dynamic model of monopolistic provision of commitment devices to sophisticated, Strotzian decision makers. We allow for unobservable heterogeneity at the contracting stage in the agents' preferences for commitment vs. flexibility. The first-best contracts under complete information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008859687
This paper considers general games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. It shows that we can characterize all outcomes of any game in which principals delegate the final decisions to the agent using arbitrary mechanisms, by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028126
This paper studies the problem of delegating the allocation of resources across multiple categories to an agent who has better information on their benefits. It focuses on a tractable, natural class of delegation policies that impose a floor or cap on the allocation to each category, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013028127