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This paper examines how employees trade off planned activities versus unplanned innovation, and how firms can choose incentives to affect these choices. It develops a multi-task model where employees makes choices between their assigned standard tasks, for which the firm has a performance...
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We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and linear individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. Thus, the two incentive schemes need to be combined to serve...
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We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent's effort is non-observable and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that the principal does not provide individual incentives if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003634017
It has been argued in the multitask agency literature that effort distortion can be mitigated by applying several performance measures in incentive contracts. This paper analyzes the efficient aggregation of multiple performance measures aimed at motivating non-distorted effort. It demonstrates...
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