In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide efficient solutions for addressing managerial moral hazard problems. We analyze a model with multiple projects where the manager obtains private information about their quality after the contract with investors is agreed. The...

This paper provides a unified framework for endogenizing two distinct organizational structures of financial intermediation. In one structure, called Bank, the intermediary is financed by issuing debt contracts to investors, and thus resembles commercial banks. In the other structure, called...

In the financial economics literature debt contracts provide efficient solutions for addressing managerial moral hazard problems. We analyze a model with multiple projects where the manager obtains private information about their quality after the contract with investors is agreed. The...

The paper shows that collusion between the CEO of a firm and outside expert generates a conflict between ex-ante provision of effort and ex-post disclosures of bad news if the alliance tends to hide early warning signals that call for restructuring of firm's assets. This tension is resolved by a...

The paper argues that the industrial organization of the financial services market is determined by the allocation of liability to repay investors. Based on the allocation of liability, the paper examines all the possible modes of organizing finance and delegated monitoring in an economy with...

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action ('investment'). We build an...

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (‘investment’). We build an...

Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (‘investment’). We build an...