This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because … nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion …

problem is to certify the private signal and make it public. When collusion between the certifier and the agent is an issue … if this certification raises the specter of collusion. …

challenge. We characterize an equilibrium delegation rule with two key properties: a) some high-skilled politicians may select …

trade-off between inefficient supervision and supervisor-agent collusion, showing that under certain conditions tolerating … collusion to take place helps to “correct” wrong supervisory signals and thus benefits the principal. Furthermore, the … characterization of the collusive-supervision contract shows that collusion should be allowed with one agent only …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion …