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Bank monitoring mitigates agency problems : new evidence using the financial covenants in bank loan commitments

Morgan, Donald P. - 1993

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000887487

Bank capital requirements and managerial self-interest

Bris, Arturo; Cantale, Salvatore - In: The quarterly review of economics and finance : journal … 44 (2004) 1, pp. 77-101

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001961756

Bank Monitoring Incentives and Optimal Abs

Pagès, Henri - 2012

compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank's performance is on target and liquidation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106606

Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS

Pagès, Henri - In: Journal of financial intermediation 22 (2013) 1, pp. 30-54

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009710634

Study on the collusive corruption in supervision of bank credit

Nan, Xu-guang; Kao, Meng-chun - In: Journal of applied finance & banking 2 (2012) 1, pp. 93-103

credit managers in bank credit activities, through three possible situations of supervision. The results indicate that … internal supervision is necessary even though supervisors and managers could collude. Meanwhile, it is inefficient for banking … ; collusive corruption ; supervision ; principal-agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009539826

Bank monitoring incentives and optimal ABS

Pagès, Henri - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009574443

Essays in financial intermediation

Drucker, Steven - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003384481

Bank leverage, welfare, and regulation

Admati, Anat R.; Hellwig, Martin - 2018

We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisis-prone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks' distress and default cause, such claims are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011925841

Bank leverage, welfare, and regulation

Admati, Anat R.; Hellwig, Martin - 2018 - Revised January 14, 2019

We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisisprone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks' distress and default cause, such claims are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011977827

Bank leverage, welfare, and regulation

Admati, Anat R.; Hellwig, Martin - 2018 - Revised November 19, 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011942146