Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked...

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked...

We run an online experiment with 408 nance professionals (money managers) and 550 subjects from the general population in Sweden (clients). We examine drivers of clients' delegation decisions, differences in decision-making quality between both groups, and professionals' ability to implement...

To study whether clients benefit from delegating financial investment decisions to an agent, we run an investment allocation experiment with 408 finance professionals (agents) and 550 participants from the general population (clients). In several between subjects treatments, we vary the mode of...

Based on an online experiment with a sample of finance professionals and participants from the general population (acting as clients), we examine drivers and motives of clients' choices to delegate investment decisions to agents. We find that clients favor delegation to investment algorithms,...

We run an online experiment with 408 finance professionals (money managers) and 550 subjects from the general population in Sweden (clients). We examine drivers of clients' delegation decisions, differences in decision-making quality between both groups, and professionals' ability to implement...