The paper explores the monitoring by 'external Names' (the principals) of 'working Names' (their agents) in the Lloyd's insurance market of the 1970s and early 1980s. The market was relying heavily on external Names to finance its rapid growth; and these principals were dependent upon their...

We exploit the change in U.S. segment reporting rules (from SFAS 14 to SFAS 131) to examine two motives for managers to conceal segment profits: proprietary costs and agency costs. Managers face proprietary costs of segment disclosure if the revelation of a segment that earns high abnormal...

We consider a principal-multi agent model that features a three-tier hierarchy, defined as a setting where the principal contracts with an agent-manager and delegates to the manager some authority to contract with other agents. A key highlight is that incentive compensation, performance...

We analyze how ownership concentration and type, and board independence are related to corporate social performance (CSP). Drawing from agency, team production and stakeholder perspectives, we argue that the distribution of costs and benefits to shareholders and other stakeholders is crucial to...

The literature on management accounting Performance Measurement (PM) focuses on the manufacturing industry, and relatively little emphasis is given on services including Financial Services Industry (FSI) in developing countries. An attempt has been made in this multiple case study to examine PM...

In this paper, we empirically examine the capital budgeting process of a large multi-divisional firm and the implications of the dynamics that underlie this process. Although investment decisions are one of the most important decisions made by firms, relatively little is known about the capital...

The present research attempts to investigate the relationship between agency problems that rise due to the free cash flow with long term profitability and income management; and also the effects of the structure of ownership on income management. The criterion used for measuring long-term...

In this study we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an...

This study examines the level and structure of CEO compensation of 2,448 CEO's from 1,622 firms spanning a range extending from 1997 through 2002. Based on agency and expectancy theories, this study tests the hypotheses that corporate diversification is associated with CEO compensation. The...

This article develops further results on earnings management and the cost of capital, which complement Strobl (Journal of Accounting Research, forth.). Within a simplified version of the model, I illustrate the existing linkage between earning management activities and firms' cost of capital,...