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Producer incentives and plant investments for Salmonella control in pork supply chains

Backus, Gé B. C.; King, Robert P. - In: European review of agricultural economics : ERAE 35 (2008) 4, pp. 547-562

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003819721

Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre (contributor); Vukina, Tomislav (contributor) - 2005 - Rev

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003284683

Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003401323

Optimal incentives under moral hazard and heterogeneous agents : evidence from production contracts data

Dubois, Pierre; Vukina, Tomislav - In: International journal of industrial organization 27 (2009) 4, pp. 489-500

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003858396

The Role of Bargaining Power in Relational Contracts

Salas, Paula Cordero - 2011

This paper studies the effect bargaining power has on self-enforcing contracts. Optimal contracts are characterized under three enforcement regimes. When enforcement is absent, I show that as the agent's bargaining power increases, her incentive payments decrease even though her total...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014184988

Processor Placements and Producer Incentives : Analyzing Broiler Chicken Production Contracts

Goodhue, Rachael E.; Rausser, Gordon C.; Simon, Leo K. - 2000

Recent theoretical work on agricultural contracts has utilized agency theory. Most of this work considers a moral hazard problem, and assumes that producers are homogeneous, so that there is no adverse selection problem. We utilize a sample of producer performance under a broiler production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014166191

Mitigating Incentive Conflicts in Inter-Firm Relationships : Evidence from Long-Term Supply Contracts

Costello, Anna M. - 2013

Using a sample of long-term supply contracts collected from SEC filings, I show that hold-up concerns and information asymmetry are important determinants of contract design. Asymmetric information between buyers and suppliers leads to shorter term contracts. However, when longer duration...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086012

Penalties, Rewards, and Inspection : Provision for Quality in Supply Chain Contracts

Starbird, S. Andrew - 2006

Rewards for better quality, penalties for poorer quality, and the type of inspection policy are among the most common quality-related provisions of supply chain contracts. In this paper, we examine the effect of rewards, penalities, and inspection policies on the behaviour of an expected cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779974

On Young Turks and Yes Men : Optimal Contracting for Advice

Häfner, Samuel - 2019

The incentives for an advisor first to diligently perform research and second to accurately report her results are investigated in a model of optimal contracting. To motivate the advisor to collect and analyze the relevant data, her compensation must include a contingent component that depends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898521

Split-Award Contracts with Investment

Gong, Jiong - 2011

award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine the effect of using multiple suppliers on investment incentives …. In a framework of generalized second-price auctions with pre-auction investment, we show that the optimality of split …-award depends on the socially efficient number of firms at the investment stage. When that number is greater than one, sole sourcing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013129999