Many executives have compensation that is potentially forfeit conditioned on the circumstances surrounding their departure from the firm. We study firms' endogenous decisions to use such compensation "holdbacks" as a bonding device and find that firms with higher executive replacement costs,...

In this paper we examine for the first time the role of agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other potential determinants, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more...

We examine theory and evidence on agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other controls, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more investors, broaden the geographic investor...

In this paper we examine for the first time the role of agents in private-market entrepreneurial financings. After controlling for the endogenous issuer-agent matching and a whole host of other potential determinants, the empirical findings in this paper indicate that agents attract more...