This paper studies dynamic compensation and risk management under cash flow volatility shocks. The optimal contract depends critically on firms' ability to make good on promised future payments to managers. When volatility is low, firms with full commitment ability implement high pay-performance...

This paper studies a continuous-time, nite-horizon contracting problem with renegotiationand dynamic inconsistency arising from non-exponential discounting. Theproblem is formulated as a dynamic game played among the agent, the principal andtheir respective future "selves", each with their own...

This paper studies the implication of persistent private information on a firm's optimal financing and investment policies. In a dynamic agency model, an investor supplies capital to an entrepreneur with an opaque production technology. The investor observes neither the true productivity of the...

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) have exploded in popularity in recent years. Their unique business model and structures beckon a comprehensive understanding of the incentives of SPAC sponsors and the implications of hidden information on the welfare of retail SPAC investors. This...