Showing 1 - 10 of 1,738
We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the effrts of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009773078
This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029170
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002346437
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether reputation element affects the decision relative performance of trust, bonus and incentive contracts using social laboratory experiments. Design/methodology/approach The study conducts the following lab experiments bonus-incentive treatment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012182130
This paper considers games in which multiple principals contract simultaneously with the same agent. We introduce a new class of revelation mechanisms that, although it does not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, it facilitates the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003860805
I analyze common agency games in which the principals, and possibly the agent, have private information. I distinguish between games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and games in which they retain some decision power after offering their mechanisms. I show that,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226
In this paper we investigate a delegation game in which the underling situation is represented by a standard Bertrand price competition. In contrast to Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK), we employ a weakly undominated SPNE as the equilibrium concept based on Shino [2012] and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009534114
In this paper we study delegation environments based on Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai ([1987], hereafter FJK). By imposing a certain assumption on the notion of implementability, called implementability with mutually rational agents, they show that every efficient outcome can be fully implemented...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009534116
We study optimal direct mechanisms for a credence goods expert who can be altruistic or spiteful. The expert has private information about her distributional preferences and possibly also about her customer's needs. We introduce a method that allows the customer to offer separate contracts to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010193284
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best performing agent must beat the second best to receive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511