We develop a structural model to investigate the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on dynamic principal-agent relationships. Our model differs from previous models by incorporating three key features in a unified framework: (i) asymmetric beliefs and risk attitudes, (ii) actions...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters, agency conflicts, and the agent's implicit incentives to influence the principal's posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect...

This study investigates how an increase in the quality of business ventures, measured as their success probability, affects trust and return on investment (ROI) in situations where the investor-entrepreneur interaction is affected by moral hazard and asymmetric information. We model a repeated...

We develop a model to show how shareholder-creditor agency conflicts interact with accounting measurement rules to influence the design of bank capital regulation. Relative to a benchmark autarkic regime, higher capital requirements mitigate inefficient asset substitution, but exacerbate...

We develop a structural model to quantitatively analyze the effects of asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts on capital structure. Capital structure reflects the dynamic tradeoff between the positive incentive effects of managerial optimism and the negative effects of risk-sharing costs....

We develop a dynamic structural model to show how asymmetric beliefs and agency conflicts interact to affect capital structure. Capital structure reflects the inter-temporal tradeoff between the positive incentive effects of managerial optimism and the negative effects of risk-sharing costs....