We study the optimal incentive scheme for a long-term project with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The moral hazard issue is due to the fact that the agent's effort, which increases the arrival rate of a Poisson process, is not observable by the principal. In addition, the agent's...

This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent setting in which the principal needs to dynamically schedule an agent to work or rest. When the agent is motivated to work, the arrival rate of a Poisson process increases, which increases the principal's payoff. Resting, on the other hand, serves as...

We consider a stylized incentive management problem over an infinite time horizon, where the principal hires an agent to provide services to customers. Customers request service in one of two ways: either via an online or a traditional, offline, channel. The principal does not observe the...

We study how incentives to boost short-term performance affect longer-term innovation output. Share repurchases that are motivated by an incentive to meet current-quarter EPS targets are associated with an increase in the quality of innovation outputs such as forward citation counts and the...