A principal has n homogeneous objects to allocate to I n agents. The principal can allocate at most one good to an agent and each agent values the good. Agents have private information about the principal's payoff of allocating the goods. There are no monetary transfers but the principal can...

A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal can costly verify agents' private signals. The...

We introduce the contraction rule for updating ambiguous beliefs. With the rule, a realized event renders an individual’s belief unambiguous when and only when the event has small ambiguity. The contraction rule is continuous and insensitive to priors that are less likely given the...

We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. The literature has identified several notions of simple mechanisms in which agents can determine their optimal strategy even if they lack cognitive skills such as predicting other agents' strategies...