We examine dynamic contracts when output has negative environmental effects and the manager (agent) can invest to build up ESG capital and mitigate the externality. The incentive component of the optimal contract rewards based on cash flow and ESG capital when the principal is risk neutral; and...

We develop a dynamic principal-agent model for financing a multistage project. The optimal contract displays the following unique features: (i) There is a pecking order between milestone bonuses and deferred compensation: when an intermediate stage succeeds, principal prefers to use deferred...

We examine optimal dynamic contracts when the firm's production generates harmful pollution undermining its productivity. The optimal contract rewards for financial performance and penalizes pollution. The combination of both contract sensitivities incentivizes the agent's effort and...

Intangible capital can be used to create new goods and services (product intangibles) or to improve the efficiency of the firm (process intangibles). We reveal and study a new empirical fact: Executive and skilled labor pay is increasing in firm process intensity (the fraction of intangibles...

We develop a continuous-time model where a risk-neutral principal contracts with a CARA manager protected by limited liability to run a project. Its output can be increased by costly unobservable managerial effort, but it is liquidated if the manager quits. The manager can trade a market...