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To explore the propagation of undesirable policies in a form of populist extremism, we construct a social learning model featuring agency problems. Politicians in different countries sequentially implement a policy. Voters learn the incumbent politician's type and the desirable policy by...
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Reputation concerns of politicians sometimes force them to implement biased policies. We study the effect of reputation (i.e., reelection) concerns on taxation in the age of globalization. To this end, we construct a two-country asymmetric tax competition model in which the residents in one of...
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I construct a dynamic model in which an ambiguity-averse principal chooses the agent to whom to delegate the decision among elites (i.e., experts) with uncertain biases and non-elites with no bias in each period. The focus is on the phenomenon that the principal distrusts elites and delegates...
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