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Principals' principles when agents' actions are hidden

Keser, Claudia; Willinger, Marc - In: International journal of industrial organization 18 (2000) 1, pp. 163-185

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001450943

Experiments on moral hazard and incentives : reciprocity and surplus-sharing

Keser, Claudia; Willinger, Marc - In: The economics of contracts : theories and applications, (pp. 293-312). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001722180

La théorie des contrats dans un contexte expérimental : un survol des expériences sur les relations "principal-agent"

Keser, Claudia; Willinger, Marc - In: Revue d'économie industrielle (2000) 2/3, pp. 237-253

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001653275

Fair offers in a repeated principal-agent relationship with hidden actions

Cochard, Franc̜ois; Willinger, Marc - In: Economica 72 (2005), pp. 225-240

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002810458

Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games

Dubois, D.; Willinger, Marc; Nguyen-Van Phu - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 41 (2012) 2, pp. 369-380

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545949

Incentives and managerial effort under competitive pressure : an experiment

Ennasri, Ahmed; Willinger, Marc - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 68 (2014) 4, pp. 324-337

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010510306

Theories of behavior in principal-agent relationships with hidden action

Keser, Claudia; Willinger, Marc - In: European economic review : EER 51 (2007) 6, pp. 1514-1533

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003565506

Principals' principles when agents' actions are hidden

Keser, Claudia - 1997

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013442924

Biased information and effort

Rosaz, Julie - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 50 (2012) 2, pp. 484-501

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009577526

Biased Information and Effort

Rosaz, Julie - 2010

We study the impact of information manipulation by a principal on the agent’s effort. In a context of asymmetric information at the principal’s advantage, we test experimentally the principal’s willingness to bias (overestimate or under-estimate) the information she gives to her agent on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190000