In this study we examine the effect of incentive contract framing on agent effort in an incomplete contract setting. Prior research suggests that when governed by complete incentive contracts, agents exert greater effort under penalty contracts relative to bonus contracts. However, in an...

We examine how competition in supplier industries affects CEO incentive intensity in procuring firms. Using the Input-Output Accounts Data (IO Data) published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), we compute a weighted supplier industry competition measure. We then predict and find that...

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. In order to examine behavioral effects, we do not permit the owner to contract on the system's output. We propose that a...

This study investigates experimentally how mutual monitoring affects effort when employees are compensated via rank-order tournaments. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that mutual monitoring may either decrease effort by facilitating collusion or increase effort by stimulating competition....